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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(1) (1991) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Under the Utah Comparative Fault Act, Utah Code Ann.
§78-27-38, et. seq., can a jury apportion the fault of the plain
tiff's employers that caused or contributed to the accident.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The following statutes are reproduced in full and can be found
in Addendum A to this brief:
1. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60 (1988) -- Exclusive remedy
against employer, or officer, agent or employee —
Occupational disease excepted.
2. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-62 (1988) — Injuries or death
caused by wrongful acts of persons other than employer,
officer, agent, or employee of said employer — Rights of
employer or insurance carrier in cause of action —
Maintenance of action — Notice of intention to proceed
against third party — Right to maintain action not
involving employee-employer relationship — Disbursement
of proceeds of recovery.
3. Utah Code Ann. §78-27-37 (1987) — Utah Liability
Reform Act: Definitions.
4. Utah Code Ann. §78-27-38 (1987) — Comparative
negligence.
5. Utah Code Ann. §78-27-39 (1987) — Separate special
verdicts on total damages and proportion of fault.
6. Utah Code Ann. §78-27-40 (1987) — Amount of
liability limited to proportion of fault.
7. Utah Code Ann. §78-27-41 (1987) — Joinder of
defendants.
8. Utah Code Ann. §78-27-43 (1987) — Effect on
immunity, exclusive remedy, indemnity, contribution.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case.
This is a personal injury action involving an employee who was
injured in an accident which occurred on the railroad tracks at the
Freeport Center, Clearfield, Utah. Plaintiff Kenneth Sullivan
("Sullivan") filed suit against his employers, various railroad
companies, a utility company, and a manufacturer and distributor of
a machine involved in the accident. Sullivan's employers (a grain
handling company, Freeport Center's owner and a joint venture of
the two) were dismissed from the lawsuit based upon workers'
compensation defenses and a finding that these entities were not
subject to FELA liability. The Denver & Rio Grande Western
Railroad Company was also dismissed. The remaining defendants
allege that Sullivan's employers were negligent, and, therefore,
should be added to the special verdict form for an apportionment
and deduction of their fault.
B. Course of Proceedings.
This issue comes to this Court by way of an Order of
Certification signed by the Honorable Thomas J. Greene, U.S.
District Court Judge, on October 4, 1991. (R. at 292) Defendant
Trackmobile Inc. ("Trackmobile") filed a motion to have the jury
apportion and compare the fault of all named defendants, whether
dismissed or present at trial. (R. at 231-32} The motion was
contested by Sullivan who claimed that only the fault of the
nonemployer party defendants may be compared. (R. at 252) The
district court has not yet ruled on the motion.
In certifying the matter to this Court, pursuant to Rule 41 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the district court found
that there appeared to be no controlling Utah law with respect to
this question. (R. at 292) Also, the court found that the Utah
state courts and the United States District Courts for the State of
Utah have rendered differing opinions on this question. (Id.)
Therefore, the district court requested an answer to this question
of Utah law. (Id.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. General Background of the Facts and Parties.
In his Third Amended Complaint, Sullivan named the following
parties as defendants: Scoular Grain Company, Freeport Center
Associates, Scoular Grain Company of Utah (all three parties are
collectively referred to as the "Scoular parties" throughout this
brief), Union Pacific Railroad Company ("Union Pacific"), the
Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company ("D&RGW"), the
Oregon Short Line Railroad Company ("Oregon Short Line"), Utah
Power & Light Company ("UP&L"), G.W. Van Keppel Company ("Van
Keppel") and Trackmobile. (R. at 175) A brief background of the
facts and description of each party's alleged involvement is as
follows:
In 1986 the U.S. government desired to store surplus grain.
The Scoular parties agreed to receive shipments of the government
grain at the Freeport Center. The grain was transported to the
Freeport Center by various railroads. (Deposition of Borchert, pp.
5-6, 11-16, 20; Deposition of Oman, pp. 96-97; Deposition of
Folland, pp. 110-16, 125-27, 130-31)
The Freeport Center comprises numerous rows of warehouses
which are leased to several commercial tenants. All of the tracks
between the rows of warehouses are owned and maintained by Union
Pacific and the D&RGW who also provided rail services for the
various tenants. There is a center (through) track approximately
one mile long down each warehouse row, with side tracks on both
sides that abut and serve the warehouses. (The physical layout of
the Freeport Center is depicted in Addendum B.) (Deposition of Lux
pp. 67-68; Deposition of Erskine, Vol. II, pp. 17, 35-36)
Union Pacific brought grain cars into its Clearfield Yard
pursuant to bills of lading and freightway bills which designated
"CCC c/o Scoular Grain Company, Clearfield, Ut." as the consignee.
Union Pacific notified Scoular at the Freeport Center when the
shipments arrived. The grain cars were then stored or held in the
Clearfield Yard until Scoular requested Union Pacific to switch
them to a particular location at their warehouse facility in the
Freeport Center. Union Pacific delivered the cars to specific
locations at or near Scoular's warehouses as requested by Scoular.
(Deposition of Lux, pp. 37, 45, 69; Deposition of Erskine, pp. 27,
43, 52-53.)
Scoular would then move the loaded cars to the desired
warehouses located anywhere from 1/4 to 1 mile away, by means of a
Trackmobile. A Trackmobile is a self-propelled machine which runs
on rail wheels or rubber tires, depending upon the intended use.
(Deposition of Fields, p. 5; Deposition of Keyt, pp. 14-15, 76-92)
Scoular employees would unload the grain into the warehouses.
When the process of unloading was completed, Scoular would switch
the empty cars back onto the center line, accumulate numerous empty
cars and prepare them for pick up by Union Pacific. Scoular
followed this procedure at the Freeport Center, handling over
10,000 rail cars in less than a year. (Deposition of Fields, p. 5;
Deposition of Keyt, pp. 14-15, 76-92)
On October 17, 1986, Sullivan was working at the Freeport
Center as an employee of the Scoular parties. Sullivan was 23
years old when he was first hired by the Scoular parties on October
12, 1986 (nine days before the accident). He had no prior experi
ence working around railroad yards. His shift was from 7:00 p.m.
to 7:00 a.m., six days a week and his duties were to assist in the
unloading and in the switching and spotting of the rail cars, as
needed. (R. at 149; Deposition of Nicholas, pp. 17, 23)
Sullivan has alleged that the Scoular parties negligently and
carelessly maintained, supervised, controlled and operated the area
where the accident occurred and failed to maintain a safe working
place for Sullivan, including failure to properly warn, instruct
and train Sullivan. Sullivan has also alleged that he was injured
by a locomotive and railcars owned and/or under the control of the
Scoular parties, Union Pacific, D&RGW, and the Oregon Short Line
and the accident was directly caused by violations of the Safety
Appliance Act ("SAA"), the Boiler Inspection Act ("BIA"), and other
statutes and regulations. He has also alleged that the parties
were liable under the Federal Employer's Liability Act ("FELA").
(R. at 175)
Trackmobile was the manufacturer and Van Keppel was the
distributor of the Trackmobile equipment owned and used by Scoular
to move the railroad cars on the tracks at the Freeport Center.
Sullivan has alleged that the Trackmobile was defective when
manufactured and sold and thereby created an unreasonable danger to
both users of the Trackmobile and those working around the
Trackmobile. (R. at 175)
Sullivan alleges that UP&L owned, installed, and upon notice
from its customer that a light was "out", maintained portions of
the exterior area lighting system in the area where the accident
occurred. That is, a tenant could install its own lighting or it
could contract with UP&L to install area lights, or it could do
both, or it could do neither. Sullivan has alleged that UP&L
failed to properly maintain lighting in the area of the accident.
(R. at 175)
B. The Accident.
The accident occurred at approximately 4:30 a.m. on October
17, 1986, on the center track between warehouses D10 and Dll. Each
warehouse is about 206 yards long and typically contains several
bays. Sullivan was working at warehouse D10, unloading grain by use
of a vaculator, a machine which sucked grain as it fell from the
bottom of the car and blew it into the warehouse. Once the
vaculator was in position and working, the workers had little to do
but monitor the intake of the vaculator. Because of the extreme
noise caused by the vaculator, the workers monitored the unloading
from the side of the car closest to the center track. (Deposition
of Hussein, pp. 29-30; Deposition of Stewart, p. 83)
There were five stationary empty cars on the center track
where Sullivan was standing. The operator of the Trackmobile
picked up two loaded cars near warehouse G10 or Fll (approximately
3/4 of a mile away), and pushed them down the center line toward
the five empty cars. As he approached the empty cars (traveling
between 10 and 20 miles per hour), the Trackmobile operator slowed,
and released the Trackmobile's coupler, allowing the cars to coast
unattended in excess of a hundred feet until they rammed into the
five empty cars. (A diagram of the accident scene is set forth in
Addendum C.) (Deposition of Nicholas, pp. 56-61)
The impact propelled the empty cars down the track knocking
Sullivan down and running over him. Sullivan recalls that he was
standing between the ends of two of the empties. He was pushed
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down on the track where wheels could run over him. As a result of
the accident Sul livan' s left arm and left leg were amputated.
Sullivan received approximately $200,000 in workers' compensation
for his injuries. (Deposition of Nicholas, pp. 56-61; Deposition of
Sullivan, Vol. I, pp. 185-90)
C. Relevant Procedural History.
Sullivan filed his initial complaint in 1987. (R. at 1) In
1989, Sullivan and the Scoular parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment. The district court granted the Scoular parties
motion for summary judgment and found that they were not a "common
carrier by railroad" under FELA and dismissed the cause of action.
(R. at 186) In addition, the court found that the Scoular parties
were the "immediate and common law employers of the plaintiff,1" and
were therefore immune from plaintiff's claim for personal injuries
under the exclusive remedy provision of Utah's Workers' Compensa
tion Law, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60. (Id.) The Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals has affirmed the district court's rulings.
The railroads also filed dispositive or partially dispositive
motions in 1990 which were granted in whole or in part. D&RGW was
dismissed from the lawsuit and Sullivan's causes of action against
Union Pacific, based upon the FELA, SAA, and BIA were dismissed.
D. Negligent Actions of Scoular.
The remaining defendants in the case are UP&L, Trackmobile,
Van Keppel, Union Pacific and Oregon Short Line. Substantial
discovery has taken place in this matter and plaintiff's experts
have testified that all named defendants (including those that have
been dismissed) are at fault in more than one particular. There
are numerous negligent acts and omissions attributable to the
Scoular parties including, but not limited to the following:
a. The Scoular parties gave little or no warning,
instruction and training concerning railroad yard procedures and
safety to Sullivan who had no railroad experience. (Deposition of
Lux, pp. 85-86, 89); Deposition of Keyt, pp. 105-06)
b. The Scoular parties hired a young man 18 years old,
with no experience or formal training in railroad procedures and
safety, to operate the Trackmobile. (Deposition of Lux, pp. 87-88,
106-08; Deposition of Folland, p. 226; Deposition of Nicholas, pp.
5, 7, 13, 15, 16, 18, 20-21)
c. The operator of the Trackmobile made a "blind kick"
in the dark without warning and without flagmen, brakemen and other
men necessary to safely move cars. (Deposition of Lux, pp. 99-104,
108-10; Deposition of Keyt, pp. 93-94, 97-100; Deposition of
Nicholas, pp. 56-61)
d. The Scoular parties provided no lighting on the "far
side" of the sidetrack, even though their men were expected to work
there. (Deposition of Lux, pp. 105, 121-28)
e. Because the Trackmobile's electrical system was not
functioning, it had no headlights, flashing safety lights or horn
to warn workmen of approaching cars; vehicle maintenance was
Scoular's responsibility. (Deposition of Lux, pp. 73-74; Deposition
of Keyt, p. 112; Deposition of Nicholas, pp. 37-40, 43, 45)
These issues may, indeed, rise to a level higher than ordinary
negligence, in view of the operations conducted and the machinery
being used.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The fault of the Scoular parties should be considered by the
jury. The purpose and terms of the Utah Comparative Fault Act as
a whole require the fault of all parties to be compared by the jury
at trial. Under the Comparative Fault Act, no defendant can be
liable for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attrib
utable to that defendant. Therefore, the fault of the Scoular
parties must be considered by the jury to effectuate the purpose
and intent of the Act.
Negligence principles also require the fault of all entities
involved in the subject accident to be compared by the jury. A
jury would be unable to fairly and accurately assess the issue of
proximate cause if the negligence of the Scoular parties is
excluded from trial. It would be unjust to preclude the jury from
considering the fault of all potential negligent actors in evalu
ating the cause of the subject accident.
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The Scoular parties are either "defendants" or "persons
seeking recovery" under the terms of the Comparative Fault Act and
as such should be included on the special verdict form. The
Scoular parties are "defendants" because they are not "immune from
suit" in actions seeking only to have the employers' fault
considered by the jury. The Scoular parties are also "persons
seeking recovery" because, as statutory employers, they are
entitled to reimbursement of the workers' compensation benefits
they paid to Sullivan.
The comparison of the Scoular parties' fault is not prohibited
by the Workers' Compensation Act. The underlying purpose and terms
of the Workers' Compensation Act do not prohibit comparison of the
Scoular parties' fault. The salutary purposes of the workers'
compensation system would not be disrupted by comparing the
employers' fault on the special verdict form.
The express language of the Workers' Compensation Act also
does not preclude the inclusion of the employers on the special
verdict form for a determination as to their proportionate fault.
An action for apportionment does not create "civil liability" and
does not constitute an "action at law" as set forth in the Workers'
Compensation Act. As such the Workers' Compensation Act does not
prevent the Scoular parties from being included on the special
verdict form.
11
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COMPARISON OF THE SCOULAR PARTIES' FAULT
IS REQUIRED BY THE UTAH COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT
A. The Purpose and Terms of the Act Taken as a Whole
Mandate the Inclusion of the Scoular Parties on the
Special Verdict Form.
Taking the Utah Comparative Fault Act as a whole, it requires
the fault of all parties to an occurrence to be compared at trial
in order for the fault of the respective parties to be accurately
apportioned. The 1986 Act abolished the doctrine of joint and
several liability in Utah. The comparative negligence statute,
U.C.A. §78-27-38, was instituted to remove joint and several
liability and insure that "no defendant is liable to any person
seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of
fault attributable to that defendant." Not including the Scoular
parties on the special verdict form will effectively subject the
remaining parties to joint and several liability. This certainly
does not appear to be the intent of the Utah Legislature.
This Court has repeatedly held that the meaning of a part of
an act should harmonize with the purpose of the whole act.
Separate parts of an act should not be construed in isolation from
the rest of the act. Utah Power & Light v. Municipal Power
Systems. 784 P.2d 137, 140 (Utah 1989) citing, Jensen v.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903 (Utah 1984) . See
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also, Osuala v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co. , 608 P.2d 242 (Utah
1980); Monson v. Hall, 584 P.2d 833 (Utah 1978).
The Utah Comparative Fault Act requires the fault of all
parties to an occurrence to be compared at trial in order for the
fault of the respective parties to be accurately apportioned. Utah
Code Annotated §§78-27-38 and 78-27-40 illustrate that no defendant
should be held liable for any amount in excess of its proportion of
fault actually attributable to that defendant. Those sections
provide, in part:
§78-27-38 Comparative Negligence.
However, no defendant is liable to any person
seeking recover for any amount in excess of
the proportion of fault attributable to that
defendant.
§78-27-4 0. Amount of Liability Limited to
proportion of Fault -- No Contribution.
Subject to §78-27-38, the maximum amount for
which a defendant may be liable to any person
seeking recovery is that percentage or
proportion of fault attributed to that
defendant. No defendant is entitled to
contribution from any other person.
To effectuate the purpose of these two provisions, it is
critical that the actions of all entities be taken into account by
the trier of fact. In order to determine a defendant's "proportion
of fault", the Act relies on the use of special verdicts which find
"the percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each person
seeking relief and to each defendant." Utah Code Ann. §78-27-39.
Therefore, to effectuate the purpose and intent of the Act, the
Scoular parties must be included on the special verdict form.
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B. Negligence Principles Require the Fault of All
Parties to Be Compared by the Trier of Fact
Evidence relating to the negligence of all entities involved
in the subject accident must be presented to the jury to permit it
to properly determine the issue of proximate cause. A jury is
unable to fairly decide the question of proximate cause without
considering all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the
subject accident. Case law firmly supports the position that the
conduct of all parties must be considered by the jury for the
purpose of fairly determining negligence.
While not passing on the precise issue presented, this Court
has, on a number of occasions, allowed the jury's consideration of
a non-party's negligence. For example, Godesky v. Provo City
Corp., 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984), involved a personal injury action
brought by a roofer who was injured when he came into contact with
an electrical wire. The plaintiff was employed by Pride Roofing
Company ("Pride"). Pride was dismissed prior to trial presumably
due to the exclusivity of the workers' compensation remedy.. In
other words, Pride was immune from further liability.
The case went to the jury which found Provo City Corporation,
the owner of the electrical wire, 70 percent negligent. The jury
also found Monticello Investors, the owner of the building, 20 per
cent negligent. The jury also assessed 10 percent of the fault to
Pride, which was not a party to the action. The case was appealed
to this Court which affirmed the decision in all respects. In
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commenting upon the correctness of the jury's verdict, this Court
stated:
This is precisely what the jury did in this
case. It compared the negligence of Provo,
Monticello and Pride and determined that each
actor's negligence concurred to cause plain
tiff's injury and that Pride's 10% negligence
did not supersede Provo's 70% negligence as a
matter of fact. I_d. at 545.
The fact scenario in Godesky is analogous to the instant
action. Pride was presumably dismissed prior to trial due to its
immunity under workers' compensation. Even though Pride was not a
party to the action, the trial court had the jury apportion its
negligence on the special verdict form because Pride's activities
contributed to the injury.
In Bishop v. Nielsen, 632 P.2d 864 (Utah 1981), this Court
similarly permitted contribution against an arguably immune party,
finding it a "joint tort-feasor." In Bishop, a father brought an
action to recover property damages sustained in a collision between
automobiles driven by defendant and plaintiff's minor daughter.
Defendant joined plaintiff's daughter as a third-party defendant,
seeking contribution.
Third-party defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground
that she was not liable to her father by virtue of the doctrine of
parent-child immunity. The trial court denied her motion and the
jury apportioned negligence 30 percent to the daughter and 70
percent to defendant.
15
On appeal this Court held that equities in favor of contri
bution outweiqhed the benefit to be achieved by strict application
of parent-child immunity. In reaching this conclusion this Court
relied upon language in Zarella v. Miller, 217 A.2d 673 (R.I. 1966)
which provided, in part:
We agree with the words of Dean Prosser that
"There is obvious lack of sense and justice in
a rule which permits the entire burden of a
loss, for which two defendants were equally,
unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered
onto one alone * * * while the latter goes
scot free." Bishop, 632 P.2d at 867.
(citations omitted)
Also in Madsen v. Salt Lake City School Board, 645 P.2d 658,
663 (Utah 1982), this Court recognized the importance of having the
fault of all negligent entities considered by the jury. This Court
held:
Excluding the City could result in the school
board being held liable for the total recovery
allowed (less reductions required by §78-27-
42) even though, as stated, its percentage of
liability, if any, might be found to be small
while that of Faddis, the City's employee, be
found to be large. To al low this to occur
would be manifestly unjust. . . . [I ]t is
imperative that the issue of proportionate
fault should be litigated between all joint
tort-feasors in the same action and resolved
by the same trier of the issues of fact.
This was found despite the fact the joint tort-feasor was an immune
governmental entity.
The ill fortune of being injured by an immune or judgment-
proof person now falls upon the plaintiffs rather than upon the
other defendants as was the practice prior to the enactment of the
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Comparative Fault Act. The risk of such ill fortune is the price
plaintiffs must pay for being relieved of the burden formerly
placed upon them by the complete bar to recovery based upon
contributory negligence. Miles v. West, 580 P.2d 876, 830 (Kan.
1978) .
Based upon the foregoing general negligence principles, it is
imperative that the actions of the Scoular parties be taken into
account by the jury. It would be "manifestly unjust" to preclude
the jury from considering the fault of all potential negligent
actors in evaluating the cause of the subject accident. A jury
would be unable to fairly and accurately assess the issue of
negligence and causation if the negligence of the Scoular parties
is excluded from trial.
C. The Scoular Parties Are Either "Defendants" or
"Persons Seeking Recovery" Within the Definitions of the
Act and as Such Should Be Included on the Special
Verdict.
In the definition section of the Act, "defendant" means any
person not immune from suit who is claimed to be liable because of
fault to any person seeking recovery. Utah Code Ann. §78-27-37(1) .
"Person Seeking Recovery" means any person seeking damages or
reimbursement on its own behalf, or on behalf of another for whom
it is authorized to act as legal representative. Utah Code Ann.
§78-27-37(3). Under the Comparative Fault Act a court is to
include on the special verdict form the percentage or proportion of
fault attributable "to each person seeking recovery and to each
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defendant." Utah Code Ann. §78-27-39. The Scoular parties are
either "defendants" or "persons seeking recovery" and as such
should be included on the special verdict form.
The Scoular parties are "defendant[s]" within the definition
of the Comparative Fault Act because they are not "immune from
suit.." Although the Workers' Compensation Act contains an exclu
sive remedy provision, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60, examination of the
terms of that Act supports the conclusion that employers are not
immune from suit in actions seeking only to have the employer's
fault considered by the jury.
The exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation
Act relates only to "civil liability." Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60.
Additionally, the Act only provides that "no action at law" may be
maintained against an employer. Id. Therefore, under the exclu
sive remedy provision employers are only "immune" from "civil
liability" in "actions at law."
By adding the Scoular parties to the special verdict form they
would not be faced with any "civil liability." Defendants are not
seeking to obtain any monetary recovery from the Scoular parties.
Therefore the Scoular parties, as employers, are not "immune" from
fault apportionment under the provisions of the Comparative Fault
Act. As such they should have their fault considered by the jury
as "defendants" on the special verdict form.
The Scoular parties should also be included on the special
verdict form because they are "persons seeking recovery" within the
definition of the Comparative Fault Act. The definition of a
"persons seeking recovery" is any person "seeking damages or
reimbursement." Utah Code Ann. §78-27-37(3) (Emphasis added)
Under Utah Code Ann. §35-1-62, an employer shares in any recovery
by the employee or the employee's heirs, to the extent compensation
has been paid. In the instant action Sullivan received over
$200,000.00 in Workers' Compensation benefits. The Scoular parties,
as statutory employers, would fall under the Act's definition of
"any person seeking damages or reimbursement" and therefore should
be included on the special verdict form.
D. The Law of other Jurisdictions Supports Comparison of
the Scoular Parties' Fault.
Other jurisdictions have held that all parties' and non
parties' proportion of fault must be ascertained by the trier of
fact even if a party cannot be held legally responsible for its
proportion of fault. Although the language of the comparative
fault acts in the other jurisdictions is not identical to Utah's
Act, the reasoning set forth by the other courts is instructive.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals examined a similar issue in
Nance v. Gulf Oil Corp., 817 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1987). In 1984,
plaintiff Nance, an employee of Service Equipment & Engineering
Company ("SEE"), brought a negligence and strict liability suit
against Gulf Oil Corporation. Plaintiff tripped on a water hose and
fell from the drill floor of SEE's rig to the top deck of an
offshore drilling platform owned by Gulf Oil Corporation. The jury
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found Gulf negligent and strictly liable and judgment was awarded
to plaintiff.
Despite a request by Gulf, the district court refused to
include on the verdict form a question pertaining to the percentage
of fault attributable to SEE, because SEE was not a party to the
suit. Id. at 1180. By failing to include this question on the
verdict form, Gulf argued the district court misapplied the
Louisiana comparative negligence statute. Gulf acknowledged that,
as Nance's employer, SEE's payment of workers' compensation
insulates it from liability for damages or contribution. Id. Gulf
nevertheless deemed SEE's percentage of fault important because of
the likelihood that it would reduce the proportionate negligence to
which Gulf was otherwise exposed.
The Fifth Circuit Court determined that the percentage of
SEE's fault was an issue material to apportioning the liability
between Gulf and Nance and the district court should have included
this issue either in its charge or the verdict form. Id. at 1181.
The court recognized that with the adoption of comparative fault,
the fault or non-fault, and the percentage of fault attributable to
each person whether party to lawsuit or not, has become relevant in
determination of damages to which an injured plaintiff is entitled.
Id. at 1180. Thus, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district
court erred when it excluded from the verdict form a question
inquiring into the employer's proportionate share of fault. Id. at
1181.
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The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana also found that the exclusive liability provision of a
workers' compensation act did not preclude measuring the employer's
proportion of fault for purposes of determining liability. In Rowe
v. Dolphin-Titan International, 655 F.Supp. 186 (E.D.La. 1987),
plaintiff alleged that he sustained injuries to his back while
working for Rebel Rentals on a rig owned by Dolphin-Titan Inter
national situated on a platform owned by Tenneco Oil Company. Rebel
Rentals, employer of plaintiff, objected to the court's stated
intention of having a jury apportion fault between all actors to
the alleged accident so that the court could enter judgment in
accordance with the Louisiana Comparative Negligence Act. Rebel
Rentals took the position that since it is statutorily immune from
suit, its proportion of fault should not be measured. The court
determined that the fault, if any, of Rebel Rentals was necessary,
not to cast Rebel Rentals liable for a share of the judgment, but
rather to determine whether Tenneco would be liable for all damages
less plaintiff's contributory fault, or whether Tenneco was liable
only for its share. Id. at 188.
In reaching this determination, the court relied upon Katie R.
Campbell v. Otis Elevator Co., 808 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1987), where
applying the law of Louisiana, the court sanctioned the computation
of fault of all actors to the accident, including the statutorily
immune employer. The court recognized that this was done, not to
cast the employer in liability, but rather to determine whether
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Otis Elevator was liable for the entire share of the verdict less
plaintiff's fault, or only for its share. Id. at 189. Although
the case was reversed and remanded for a new trial due to erroneous
instructions given on res ipsa loquitur and the duty of care owed
by the elevator maintenance companies, the Fifth Circuit did not
find error in the court's apportionment of fault among the actors.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has also recognized that the
negligence of the employer must be considered in determining
comparative fault even if the employer is immune from common law
tort liability because of the exclusive remedy provided by the
workers' compensation law. Bode v. Clark Equipment Co., 719 P.2d
824 (Okla. 1986). The Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized that "the
cornerstone of comparative negligence is founded on attaching
liability in direct proportion to the fault of each entity whose
negligence caused the damage." Id. at 827 (emphasis in original).
The Oklahoma court additionally found substantial authority to
support the conclusion that the negligence of non-parties, or
"ghost tortfeasors" should be considered in assessing proportionate
fault in comparative negligence cases. Id.
Ln Paul v. N. L. Industries, Inc., 624 P.2d 68, 70 (Okla.
1980), and in Gaither v. City of Tulsa, 664 P.2d 1026, 1029 (Okla.
1983), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the negligence of
tortfeasors who are not parties to the lawsuit should be considered
by the jury in order to properly apportion the negligence of the
parties. The Oklahoma court also relied upon a Kansas decision
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Anderson v. National Carriers, Inc., 695 P.2d 1293, 1298 (Kan.App.
1985). In Anderson, a subcontractor joined his principal, the
injured party's employer, as a "phantom" party to the suit in order
to have the employer's percentage of liability assessed by the
jury. The plaintiff appealed and the court ruled that even though
the employer was immune from negligence liability because of the
workers' compensation statutes, it was a necessary party for
purpose of considering and allocating proportionate fault. Based
upon the foregoing, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Bode reached the
"unavoidable conclusion" that the negligence of a party defendant
must be combined with the percentage of negligence attributable to
non-party tortfeasors in order to determine if the degree of fault
charged to the plaintiff is greater than that owing to all persons,
firms or corporations causing such damage. Bode, 719 P.2d at 827.
Conner v. West Shore Equipment of Milwaukee, 227 N.W.2d 660
(Wise. 1975) , also concerned an appeal brought to ascertain whether
it was proper to exclude from the special verdict form a question
relating to the negligence of the employer, when the employer was
not a party to the negligence action and could not be held liable
by reason of the exclusivity of the workers' compensation remedy.
In holding that it was proper to ask the jury to consider the
negligence of the employer, the court stated:
It is established without doubt that, when
apportioning negligence, a jury must have the
opportunity to consider the negligence of all
parties to the transaction, whether or not
they be parties to the lawsuit and whether or
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not they can be liable to the plaintiff or to
the other tortfeasors either by operation of
law or because of a prior release. . . . at
the requested special-verdict stage of a
lawsuit, it is immaterial that the entity is
not a party or is immune from further
liability. [citations omitted] [T]he appor
tionment must include all whose negligence may
have contributed to the arising of the cause
of action. Id. at 662.
The Idaho court adopted this rule in Pocatello Ind. Park Co.
v. Steel West, Inc., 621 P.2d 399 (Idaho 1980). The Idaho court
stated that, "The reason for such [a rule] is that true apportion
ment cannot be achieved unless that apportionment includes all
tortfeasors guilty of causal negligence either causing or contri
buting to the occurrence in question, whether or not they are
parties to the case." Id. at 403, quoting Heft & Heft, Comparative
Negligence Manual, §8.131, at 12 (1978). The Idaho court also
noted that apparently only Florida has adopted a contrary position.
Other cases espousing this viewpoint include Huber v. Henley, 656
F.Supp. 508, 509 (S.D.Ind. 1987) (Any damages sustained by plain
tiff will be diminished, not only in proportion to his own fault,
but also in proportion to fault attributable to any nonparties);
Martinez v. First National Bank of Santa Fe, 755 P.2d 606, 608
(N.M.App. 1987) (Under comparative negligence, fault may be
allocated between defendant and a tortfeasor not joined as a party
to the action); Burton v. Fisher Controls Co., 713 P.2d 1137, 1143
(Wyo. 1986) (In a comparative negligence case where relative fault
is in issue, the jury must not only consider causative negligence
24
of the parties to the litigation, but it must also ascertain the
percentage of fault for all of the participants in the tortious
conduct which causes injury).
The treatises which discuss this issue are in accord in
concluding that the better reasoned approach is to require the
neqligence of all concurrent tortfeasors, whether they are parties
to the action or not, to be taken into account by the jury in
apportioning liability.
It is accepted practice to include all
tortfeasors in the apportionment question.
This includes non-parties who may be unknown
tortfeasors, phantom drivers, and persons
alleged to be negligent but not liable in
damages to the injured party such as the
third-party cases arising in the workmen's
compensation area. Heft & Heft, Comparative
Negligence Manual, §8.100, at 14 (rev. ed.)
See also, Schwartz, Comparative Negligence, at 262-63 (2d ed.
1986) .
The respective negligence of the Scoular parties must be
apportioned by the fact finder in order to comply with the stated
purpose of Utah's Comparative Fault Act. Plaintiff's experts have
concluded that the Scoular parties are at fault in more than one
particular. Plaintiff's fellow employees have described in great
detail the lack of safety procedures and training before the
accident. As such, the comparison of the Scoular parties' fault is
required by the Comparative Fault Act.
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POINT II
THE COMPARISON OF THE SCOULAR PARTIES FAULT
IS NOT PROHIBITED BY THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT
A. The Purpose and Terms of the Workers' Compensation
Act Do Not Prohibit Comparison of the Scoular Parties'
Fault.
Since the enactment of the Workers' Compensation Act in 1917,
the exclusive remedy of an employee who is injured in the course of
employment is the right to recover compensation provided for in the
Act. Murray v. Wasatch Grinding Co., 73 Utah 430, 274 P. 940, 942
(1929). The Workers' Compensation Act is predicated on the police
power, the right of the state to regulate the status of employer
and employee for the general welfare of the people and the state.
Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet Wash Laundry, 108 Utah 1, 156 P.2d 885, 887
(1945). It is a beneficial act, passed to protect employees and
those dependant upon them and to tax the costs of human wreckage
against the industry which employs it. Id.
The purpose of the Act is to view the worker as a part of the
industrial setup and impose upon the industry the costs and burdens
of the breakage, wreckage or destruction of the human part of the
industrial machinery. Compensation under the Act is, therefore,
allowed without reference to negligence, risk inherent in the
tasks, or the conduct of other workers. Id.
The purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act are not thwarted
by including the employer on the special verdict form. The
legislative scheme of the Act is independent of negligence
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principles. By comparing the fault of the employer on the special
verdict form the State's police power is not compromised. The
employees remain protected and industry still retains the costs and
burdens of any injury it may cause its workers. The salutary
purposes of the system would not be disrupted in any respect.
B. Comparison of the Scoular Parties' Fault is Not
"Civil Liability" or an "Action at Law" as Set Forth in
the Workers' Compensation Act.
The express language of the Workers' Compensation Act does not
preclude the inclusion of an employer on a special verdict form for
a determination as to its proportionate fault. The exclusive
remedy provision of the Act, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60 provides, in
part:
The right to recover compensation . . . for
injuries sustained by an employee . . . shall
be the exclusive remedy against the employer .
and the liabilities of the employer
imposed by this act shall be in place of any
and all other civil liability whatsoever, at
common law or otherwise . . . and no action at
law may be maintained against an employer . .
based upon any accident . . . of an
employee.
An action for apportionment of fault does not create "civil
liability" and does not constitute an "action at law." "Actions at
law" have generally been defined as actions for money damages, as
opposed to suits in equity for injunctive relief. Philpott v.
Superior Court, 36 P.2d 635 (Cal. 1934) ; Royal Indemnity Co. v.
Sangor. 164 N.W. 821 (Wise. 1917).
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Taken in this context, the exclusive remedy provision of the
Workers' Compensation Act was implemented to shield employers from
paying any additional money than that required under the express
provisions of the Act. The Act does not expressly prevent the
apportionment of the employer's fault by including them on the
special verdict form.
In Yantes v. Signode Corp., et al., Civil No. 89-NC-0055-S,
the Utah Attorney General's Office was asked to comment upon an
issue concerning the constitutionality of the exclusive remedy
provision of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60, and of the comparative
negligence provision which preserves statutory immunities, Utah
Code Ann. §78-27-43. (A copy of the opinion is attached in the
Addendum at D.) In the opinion letter, the Attorney General's
Office noted that it appeared that a constitutional challenge would
only arise if the exclusive remedy provision prevented the joining
of an employee for the appointment of fault. The Attorney
General's Office stated:
Since the exclusive remedy provision, Utah
Code Ann. §35-1-60, accomplishes its purpose
by providing that "no action at law" (i.e. ,
action for money damages) may be maintained
against an employer, there is no conflict with
joining an employer solely to apportion fault,
a proceeding which cannot impose a money
judgment on the employer. Therefore, there
being no statutory language giving an employer
immunity from suit but only immunity from
money damages, the immunity of an employer is
in no way impaired by being joined for the
purpose of apportioning fault.
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In the instant action defendants are not attempting to impose
"civil liability" and are not maintaining an "action at law"
against the Scoular parties. Rather, defendants are merely seeking
to include the Scoular parties on the special verdict form for an
apportionment of their fault. As such the Workers' Compensation
Act does not prevent the Scoular parties from being included on the
special verdict form.
POINT III.
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES COMPEL THE INCLUSION
OF THE SCOULAR PARTIES ON THE SPECIAL VERDICT FORM
If the Scoular parties are not included on the special verdict
form defendants' constitutional rights will be violated. Defen
dants will be denied equal protection of the laws under the U. S.
Constitution, Amendment XIV, § 1, as well as under Article I, § 24
of the Utah Constitution. Additionally, defendants will be denied
open access to the courts under the Utah Constitution, Article I,
§ 11. Finally, if the Scoular parties are not included on the
special verdict form the Uniform Operations of Laws Clause of the
Utah Constitution will be violated.
A. Equal Protection
The United States Constitution provides that a state cannot
deprive a person of equal protection of the laws. U.S. Const,
amend. XIV. The Utah Constitution similarly commands that "all
laws of a general nature shall have uniform application." Utah
Const, art. I, § 24. The named defendants' rights under these two
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constitutional provisions will be violated if the Scoular parties
are not listed on the special verdict form.
In the instant action the named defendants will be held
accountable for the amount of negligence attributable to Sullivan's
employers if the negligent employers are not included on the
special verdict form. In other words, defendants will be liable
for more than their proportionate share of the operative negligence
as it is clear that plaintiff's employer and fellow employees were
very negligent; witness plaintiff's very strenuous attempts to keep
them in the suit. In cases involving only non-employer defendants,
each defendant would only be liable for its own proportionate
amount of fault. Therefore, defendants would be treated differ
ently. This results in an unequal application of the laws which
would violate both the United States and Utah Constitution.
B. Open Court and Uniform Operation of Laws
Utah's Constitution provides that "all courts shall be open"
and every person "shall have remedy by due course of law." Utah
Const, art. I, § 11. This Court has held that Article I, § 11 is
satisfied if the law provides an alternative or substitute remedy
to the injured person or if the elimination of a remedy eliminates
a social or economic evil. Sun Valley Waterbeds v. Herm Hughes &
Son, 782 P.2d 188 (Utah 1989). If the Scoular parties are not
included on the special verdict form, defendants will be deprived
of their right to have the negligence of all parties compared by
the trier of fact. The defendants will be automatically liable for
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the Scoular parties' proportionate amount of fault without an
alternative remedy or method by which the jury can consider and
deduct the employers' negligence.
No social evil is eliminated if a jury is not allowed to
compare the fault of the negligent employers and fellow employees
on the special verdict form. As previously set forth in this
brief, the salutary purposes of the Workers' Compensation system
would not be disrupted. An evil will be created if any defendant
is held responsible for more than its proportionate share of fault.
Therefore, the Open Courts and the Uniform Operations of Laws
Clauses of the Utah Constitution will be violated if the Scoular
parties are not included on the special verdict form.
CONCLUSION
Certified defendants request that this Court provide an answer
to the Honorable Thomas J. Greene, U.S. District Court Judge, on
this outstanding question of Utah law. Namely, certified defen
dants request an opinion that under the Utah Comparative Fault Act
a jury can apportion the fault of Sullivan's employers who caused
or contributed to the subject accident.
Respectfully submitted this / j day of April, 1992.
Paul M. Belhap
Victoria K. Kidman
Attorneys for Defendant/Certified
Defendant Trackmobile, Inc.
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DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
35-1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer, agent or
employee -- Occupational disease excepted.
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions
of this title for injuries sustained by an employee, whether
resulting in death or not, shall be the exclusive remedy against
the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy against any officer,
agent or employee of the employer and the liabilities of the
employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any and all other
civil liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to such
employee or to his spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents,
next of kin, heirs, personal representatives, guardian, or any
other person whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury or
death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated or incurred by
such employee in the course of or because of or arising out of his
employment, and no action at law may be maintained against an
employer or against any officer, agent or employee of the employer
based upon any accident, injury or death of an employee. Nothing
in this section, however, shall prevent an employee (or his
dependents) from filing a claim with the industrial commission of
Utah for compensation in those cases within the provisions of the
Utah Occupational Disease Disability Act, as amended.
35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of persons
other than employer, officer, agent, or employee of said
employer -- Rights of employer or insurance carrier in
cause of action -- Maintenance of action -- Notice of
intention to proceed against third party -- Right to
maintain action not involving employee-employer
relationship -- Disbursement of proceeds of recovery.
When any injury or death for which compensation is payable
under this title shall have been caused by the wrongful act or
neglect of a person other than an employer, officer, agent, or
employee of said employer, the injured employee, or in case of
death his dependents, may claim compensation and the injured
employee or his heirs or personal representative may also have an
action for damages against such third person. If compensation is
claimed and the employer or insurance carrier becomes obligated to
pay compensation, the employer or insurance carrier shall become
trustee of the cause of action against the third party and may
bring and maintain the action either in its own name or in the name
of the injured employee, or his heirs or the personal representa
tive of the deceased, provided the employer or carrier may not
settle and release the cause of action without the consent of the
commission. Before proceeding against the third party, the injured
employee, or, in case of death, his heirs, shall give written
A-l
notice of such intention to the carrier or other person obligated
for the compensation payments, in order to give such person a
reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in the proceeding.
For the purposes of this section and notwithstanding the
provisions of Section 35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs or
personal representative may also maintain an action for damages
aqainst subcontractors, general contractors, independent
contractors, property owners or their lessees or assigns, not
occupying an employee-employer relationship with the injured or
deceased employee at the time of his injury or death.
If any recovery is obtained against such third person it shall
be disbursed as follows:
(1) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys'
fees, shall be paid and charged proportionately again .t the
parties as their interests may appear. Any such fee charge
able to the employer or carrier is to be a credit upon any fee
payable by the injured employee or, in the case of death, by
the dependents, for any recovery had against the third party.
(2) The person liable for compensation payments shall be
reimbursed in full for all payments made less the propor
tionate share of costs and attorneys' fees provided for in
Subsection (1).
(3) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee or his
heirs in case of death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in
full any obligation thereafter accruing against the person
liable for compensation.
7 8-2 7-37. Definitions.
As used in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43:
(1) "Defendant" means any person not immune from suit who
is claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking
recovery.
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty,
act, or omission proximately causing or contributing to injury
or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery, including,
but not limited to, negligence in all its degrees,
contributory negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability,
breach of express or implied warranty of a product, products
liability, and misuse, modification, or abuse of a product.
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(3) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking
damages or reimbursement on its own behalf, or on behalf of
another for whom it is authorized to act as legal
representative.
78-27-38. Comparative negligence.
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar
recovery by that person. He may recover from any defendant or
group of defendants whose fault exceeds his own. However, no
defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount
in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to that
defendant.
78-27-39. Separate special verdicts on total damages and
proportion of fault.
The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall,
direct the jury, if any, to find separate special verdicts deter
mining the total amount of damages sustained and the percentage or
proportion of fault attributable to each person seeking recovery
and to each defendant.
78-27-40. Amount of liability limited to proportion of fault — No
contribution.
Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a
defendant may be liable to any person seeking recovery is that
percentage or proportion of the damages equivalent to the
percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that defendant. No
defendant is entitled to contribution from any other person.
78-27-41. Joinder of defendants.
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a party to
the litigation, may join as parties any defendants who may have
caused or contributed to the injury or damage for which recovery is
sought, for the purpose of having determined their respective
proportions of fault.
A-3
78-27-43. Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy, indemnity,
contribution.
Nothing in Sections 73-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or
impairs any common law or statutory immunity from liability,
including, but not limited to, governmental immunity as provided in
Title 63, Chapter 30, and the exclusive remedy provisions of Title
35, Chapter 1. Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-42
affects or impairs any right to indemnity or contribution arising
from statute, contract, or agreement.
A-4
ADDENDUM B
PHYSICAL LAYOUT OF FREEPORT CENTER
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